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When Religious Belief Becomes Scientific 
Opinion: 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and the Unraveling of 
Federal Rule 702 
 
Meredith Rachel Mandell1 
 
For over 20 years, the federal courts have adhered to a number of rules designed to 
ensure that only valid and reliable science forms the basis for court decisions.  The 
seminal case is Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,2 in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court set down the core standards for admissibility of scientific opinions.  Those 
standards later became embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which reads: 
 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts 
of the case.3 
 
There have been thousands of federal court decisions involving the Daubert/Rule 702 
standards,4 and many state courts now follow the same standards.5 A principal goal of 
Rule 702 is to guard against the danger of “junk science”6 tainting decisions that depend 
on scientific or other specialized knowledge.7  Yet, in spite of Rule 702 and its 20-year 
                                                 
1 J.D., 2016 Northwestern University School of Law. I greatly appreciate the generous help of Fern E. 
Murdoch, Ph.D., Center for Reproductive Science, Northwestern University, on the scientific sections in 
this Note. My thanks as well to my editors on the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy for their 
excellent edits, meaty comments, and patience with the writing process. All errors and omissions are my 
own. I dedicate this article to my mother, Stephanie Scharf, a lawyer who has been a great mentor to me. 
2 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
3 FED. R EVID. 702.  
4 WestlawNext shows over 100,000 citing references for both Daubert and Rule 702.  See Westlaw, 
next.westlaw.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2016). 
5 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. EVID. 702; ARK. R. EVID. 702; CONN. CODE EVID. § 7-2; FLA. STAT. §§ 90.702.   
6 See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 2–3, (Basic Books 1991). 
The author provides a thorough historical and social review of “junk science,” its origins, and its invasion 
of the American Courtroom.  
7 See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000 amendments) (“Rule 702 has been amended in 
response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and to the many cases 
applying Daubert, including Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999). In Daubert the Court 
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history, a recent and highly publicized legal decision, which rested on faulty scientific 
beliefs, was made without the benefit of a Rule 702 analysis. 
The case is Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,8 in which the Supreme Court held that the 
contraceptive mandate, a regulation promulgated by the Department of Health and 
Human Services under the Affordable Care Act (the Act),9 substantially burdened the 
employers’ exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(RFRA).10  The mandate substantially burdened the Hobby Lobby employers’ religious 
beliefs because it required the employers to provide access to four specific contraceptives 
which they believed were abortifacients,11 and the Department of Health and Human 
Services had not proven the mandate was the “least restrictive means” of furthering a 
compelling governmental interest.12   
The Supreme Court made a critical assumption that the four contraceptives at issue 
were, in fact, abortifacients. But the Court received no scientific evidence, nor did any 
court below, for the proposition that the challenged contraceptives were actually 
tantamount to abortions.  In essence, the Supreme Court deferred not only to the 
employers’ religious beliefs that abortion is wrong, but also to their erroneous scientific 
beliefs about whether any of four specific contraceptives constitutes an “abortion.”   
Such deference became the basis for the Court’s decision that the four particular 
types of contraceptives need not be funded by the Hobby Lobby employers.  Importantly, 
neither the Hobby Lobby trial courts13 nor the Hobby Lobby appellate courts14 required a 
Rule 702 review of the scientific opinions that were the basis Hobby Lobby plaintiffs’ 
position.   
The lack of Rule 702 review begs the question: in light of more than 20 years of 
federal jurisprudence setting the modern standards for the use of reliable and valid 
science in federal litigation, how can the Supreme Court justify its reliance on a religious 
belief rather than science for its conclusion about what what constitutes an abortion?  In 
essence, the Hobby Lobby court permitted junk science to trump access to contraceptives.  
The decision is all the more troubling in light of the long-established constitutional right 
of access to contraceptives.15   
In this paper, Part I will review the reasons why Rule 702 exists and what standards 
are imposed on the admissibility of scientific opinions; Part II will review the decision in 
                                                                                                                                                 
charged trial judges with the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert testimony, 
and the Court in Kumho clarified that this gatekeeper function applies to all expert testimony, not just 
testimony based in science.”). 
8 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct 2751 (2014). The Supreme Court decision encompassed 
two consolidated cases: No. 13-354, Sebelius, Sec’y of Health and Human Serv. v. Hobby Lobby Stores; 
and No. 13-356, Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Sebelius. I will refer to both cases as “Hobby Lobby.” 
9 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2015). 
10 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb et seq. (2015). 
11 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
12 Id. at 2757. 
13 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F.Supp.2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012); Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, et al., 917 F.Supp.2d 394 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
14 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302, at *1 (10th Cir. 2012); 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 724 F.3d 377 (3d. 
Cir. 2013). 
15 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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Hobby Lobby and the purported science involved in the case; Part III will review the lack 
of Rule 702 review by the Hobby Lobby lower courts; Part IV will review the scientific 
debate concerning contraceptives as abortifacients; Part V will consider the admissibility 
of potentially conflicting scientific opinions in Hobby Lobby; and Part VI will examine 
how scientific evidence could have changed the outcome of the case.  In conclusion, I 
consider the implications of Hobby Lobby from the perspective of how courts should 
resolve factual disputes between scientific knowledge and religious beliefs. 
 
I.RULE 702: ITS PURPOSE AND OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO SCIENTIFIC OPINIONS IN 
LITIGATION 
 
A. Purpose of Rule 702 
 
The purpose of Rule 702 is to protect the scientific integrity of decisions made in 
courtrooms by barring “junk science.”16  As explained by Peter Huber, one of many 
commentators who castigated the pre-Daubert trend of junk science invading the 
courtroom in high profile litigation cases: 
 
Junk science is the mirror image of real science, with much of the same 
form but none of the same substance. There is the astronomer, on the one 
hand, and the astrologist, on the other. The chemist is paired with the 
alchemist, the pharmacologist with the homoeopathist. Take the serious 
sciences of allergy and immunology, brush away the detail and rigor, and 
you have the junk science of clinical ecology. The orthopedic surgeon is 
shadowed by the osteopath, the physical therapist by the chiropractor, the 
mathematician by the numerologist and the cabalist … Junk science cuts 
across chemistry and pharmacology, medicine and engineering. It is a 
hodgepodge of biased data, spurious inference, and logical legerdemain, 
patched together by researchers whose enthusiasm for discovery and 
diagnosis far outstrips their skill. It is a catalog of every conceivable kind 
of error: data dredging, wishful thinking, truculent dogmatism, and, now 
and again, outright fraud.17  
 
Before the 20th century, courts in the United States did not rigorously examine the 
reliability of expert testimony.18  But as the nation leapt forward in the realms of science 
and technology during the Industrial Revolution, expert scientific witnesses began to 
                                                 
16 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702:5 (7th ed. 2013).  
17 See HUBER, supra note 6, at 2–3. Accord JACK KITAEFF, MALINGERING, LIES, AND JUNK SCIENCE IN THE 
COURTROOM (2007); William Glaberson, The Nation: Assigning Blame; The Courts Vs. Scientific 
Certainty, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/27/weekinreview/the-nation-
assigning-blame-the-courts-vs-scientific-certainty.html. 
18 Janusz Puzniak, Expert Evidence: The Road from Daubert to Joiner and Kumho Tire, 37 COURT REV. 
32, (Fall 2000) (citing Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 474–75 
(1986) [hereinafter Puzniak]. 
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appear more frequently to testify during trials.19  As a consequence, legal scholars and 
practitioners began to think about how best to assess expert testimony.20  
In Frye v. United States,21 where a criminal defendant questioned the admissibility 
of a systolic blood pressure test as evidence, what was a crude precursor to the polygraph 
“lie detector” test, the D.C. Circuit ruled that expert testimony must be grounded in 
established scientific technique or, in other words, the “thing from which the deduction is 
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs.”22  This Frye test or the “general acceptance test” became the 
common law standard for 70 years, surviving the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence until the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision in 1993.23  The Frye test required 
judges first to identify the scientific field of the testimony and then, second, determine 
whether the specific scientific principle at issue was “generally accepted” by scientists in 
that particular field.24  The test was easy for judges to apply, but some felt it was overly 
broad and excluded valuable scientific testimony.25  As one commentator writing about 
the genesis of Rule 702, noted: 
 
The Frye test was relatively simple, but rigid in its all-or-nothing 
approach. It was praised as guaranteeing uniformity of decisions, 
eliminating the need for prolonged admissibility hearings, and providing 
an effective method to determine the admissibility of the evidence by the 
specialists. The test was criticized, however, for establishing too large a 
threshold for useful and otherwise reliable scientific testimony that was 
novel and not yet ‘generally accepted’ in the field.26 
 
In 1975, Congress approved the Federal Rules of Evidence, a new uniform code 
that would apply to all federal civil and criminal cases.27  The rules seemingly liberalized 
the old “general acceptance test” to a less stringent “relevancy standard.”28  The original 
Rule 702 stated that if “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,”29 then a witness 
                                                 
19 Id. 
20 See e.g., Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,  HARV. L. 
REV. 40–58 (1901). 
21 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
22 Id. at 1014. 
23 Puzniak, supra note 18, at 33. 
24 Puzniak, supra note 18, at 33. 
25 Puzniak, supra note 18, at 33. 
26 Puzniak, supra note 18, at 33. 
27 Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee: A Short 
History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678 (2000). 
28 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993); see also Howard J. Zlotnick & 
Jr. Lin, Handwriting Evidence in Federal Courts: From Frye to Kumho, 13 FORENSIC SCI. REV., 87-99 
(2001) [hereinafter Zlotnick & Lin]; but cf. David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and 
Future of the General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385 (2001) (arguing that Daubert, has in fact, 
evolved into a stricter test than Frye). 
29 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702 App.01 (Joseph 
M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2d ed. 2015). 
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“qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,” could 
testify “in the form of opinion or otherwise.”30  However, judges remained uncertain 
whether the new federal rules overruled the old common law Frye standard.31  There 
were also concerns that the rules went too far, that they opened the floodgates for junk 
science courtroom testimony.32  These concerns came to a head in the 1980s “when some 
judges grew skeptical of some of the scientific claims in high-profile cases.”33  
The issues were reiterated in the Department of Justice’s Tort Working Group 
1986 report examining the underlying causes of the “crisis in insurance availability and 
affordability.” 34   The report decried the “undermining of causation” 35  and the 
“increasingly serious problem in toxic tort cases” 36  of faulty science entering into 
courtroom deliberations.  The result was “findings of causation which simply cannot be 
justified or understood from the standpoint of the current state of credible scientific and 
medical knowledge” and “a deep and growing cynicism about the ability of tort law to 
deal with difficult scientific and medical concepts in a principled and rational way.”37 
In large part, the root causes of junk science are the economic incentives for both 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, who will get a lucrative cut from any settlement or win, and expert 
witnesses who are paid gigantic sums by the hour and who need to find convenient 
“scientific theories” to bolster their case.  As one commentator concluded, “junk science 
in the courtroom emanates from testimony by expert witnesses hired not for their 
scientific expertise, but for their willingness, for a price, to say whatever is needed to 
make the client’s case.” 38   Junk science was frequently a scare tactic, employed in 
settlement negotiations to threaten the other side, with the specter that “so-called ‘expert’ 
testimony” could be an irreparable blow to the opponent’s case.39  
 
B. Background to current Rule 702 
 
In an effort to address the growing problem, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified Rule 
702, the rule governing testimony by expert witnesses under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, in its landmark Daubert decision. 40   In Daubert, plaintiff-parents sued a 
pharmaceutical company on behalf of their minor children who were born with serious 
birth defects. 41   The parents alleged that the mothers’ ingestion of the company’s 
                                                 
30 Id. 
31 Barbara Hughes Erard & Mimi Keidan Seltzer, Evolving Standard of Scientific Acceptance Under 
Daubert, 73 MICH. B.J. 161 (1994). 
32 Marc S. Klein, Expert Testimony in Pharmaceutical Product Liability Actions, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. 
L.J. 393, 394 (1990). 
33 Glaberson, supra note 17. 
34 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 1-91 
(1986), [hereinafter TORT POLICY REPORT]. 
35 Id. at 33. 
36 Id. at 35. 
37 Id.  
38 Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science—The Lawyer’s Ethical Responsibilities, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 449 
(1998). 
39 Id. 
40 Daubert, v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
41 Id. at 582. 
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prescription anti-nausea drug, Bendectin, caused the birth defects. 42  After reviewing 
scientific opinions supporting both the plaintiffs’ and defendant’s position, the district 
court granted summary judgment to the defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer. The 
court concluded that the plaintiffs’ expert evidence was insufficient to prove that 
Bendectin caused the birth defects. The court specifically pointed to the plaintiffs’ 
inability to proffer epidemiological evidence from systematic studies of research on 
people, in support of their claims, and that the plaintiffs’ expert testimony, based upon 
newer laboratory research, including in vitro studies, chemical structure analyses and 
animal studies, was insufficient to prove causation and thus could not be taken to a jury.43  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed under the prevailing “general acceptance” standard for 
scientific evidence, holding that a scientific opinion “is admissible if it is generally 
accepted as a reliable technique among the scientific community.”44  
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court detailed the nature of the scientific opinions 
that the district court faced. 45   The defendant’s expert witness was a physician and 
epidemiologist who had “published numerous articles on the magnitude of risk from 
exposure to various chemical and biological substances.”46  Summarizing the affidavit of 
the defendant’s expert, which was submitted in support of its motion for summary 
judgment, the Court stated:  
 
[H]e had reviewed all the literature on Bendectin and human birth 
defects—more than 30 published studies involving over 130,000 patients. 
No study had found Bendectin to be a human teratogen (i.e., a substance 
capable of causing malformations in fetuses). On the basis of this review, 
Doctor Lamm concluded that maternal use of Bendectin during the first 
trimester of pregnancy has not been shown to be a risk factor for human 
birth defects.47 
 
The plaintiffs responded to the defendant’s motion with the “testimony of eight 
experts of their own, each of whom had impressive credentials.” 48  Contrary to the 
defendant expert’s affidavit, the plaintiffs’ experts asserted that Bendectin could have 
caused the birth defects.49  The plaintiffs’ experts based their conclusions on ‘in vitro’ 
(test tube) and ‘in vivo’ (live) animal studies that found a link between Bendectin and 
malformations; pharmacological studies of the chemical structure of Bendectin that 
purported to show similarities between the structure of the drug and that of other 
substances known to cause birth defects; and the ‘reanalysis’ of previously published 
epidemiological human statistical studies.50 
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989), aff’d, 95 F.2d 1128 
(9th Cir. 1991).  
44 Id.  
45 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583. 
46 Id. at 582 n.1 (explaining the district court case in Daubert). 
47 Id. at 582. 
48 Id. at 583. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
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In deciding the case, the Supreme Court rejected the general acceptance standard as 
the exclusive basis for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony.51  Instead, the 
court held that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the “basic standard of relevance was 
a liberal one,” more so than the common law Frye test.52  With specific regard to Rule 
702, “the drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid ‘general acceptance’ 
requirement would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust of the Federal Rules and their 
‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.’” 53  The 
Court, however, cautioned that simply because the Federal Rules superseded Frye did not 
mean that Rules placed “no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific 
evidence.”54  
The Daubert Court went on to articulate a set of factors that were meant to be non-
exclusive guidelines to help judges determine what is valid science, including 1) whether 
the expert's technique or theory can be or has been tested—that is, whether the expert's 
theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a 
subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) 
peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or 
theory when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) 
whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific 
community.55  The Supreme Court cautioned that a judge should not vet an expert’s 
testimony based “on the conclusions they generate,” but rather the “focus, of course, must 
be solely on principles and methodology.”56  
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge was responsible for ensuring that 
“any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant but reliable.”57  
Essentially, Daubert deemed trial judges to be “gatekeepers” of scientific evidence, who 
have the obligation to exclude “unreliable testimony.”58 
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit sustained the district court’s 
exclusion of testimony from the plaintiffs’ experts under the newly announced Daubert 
standard. 59   The plaintiffs’ experts had not based their testimony on preexisting or 
independent research, did not publish their work in scientific journals, and did not 
adequately explain their methodology. 60  As a result, the testimony of the plaintiffs’ 





                                                 
51 Id. at 588. 
52 Id. at 587. 
53 Id. at 588. 
54 Id. at 589. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 595. 
57 Id.  
58 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000 amendments). 
59 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F. 3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). 
60 Id. at 1317–19.   
61 Id. at 1322.  
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C. The role of judge as “gatekeeper” and standards for admissibility of scientific 
opinion under Rule 702 
 
Following Daubert, Rule 702 was amended in 2000.62  The Advisory Committee 
took pains to emphasize that the Daubert factors were meant to guide how courts would 
evaluate the reliability of scientific testimony—and thus its admissibility—although the 
factors were by no means an exclusive checklist. 63   And, in fact, subsequent to the 
Supreme Court’s decision, courts have developed additional factors, for example, 
whether experts are “proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out 
of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have 
developed their opinions expressly for the purposes of testifying.”64 
Even when courts rule on preliminary injunctions—which typically proceed faster 
than proceedings on the merits—a Rule 702 analysis is required.  For example, the 10th 
Circuit held in Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods65 that a district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying a preliminary injunction after finding that expert testimony was unreliable66 
and entitled to “scant weight”67 in accordance with Daubert.  The State alleged a causal 
link between poultry litter from poultry farmers and fecal bacteria contamination found in 
the Illinois River Watershed, but the trial court held that the State could not “demonstrate 
its likelihood of success on the merits, the first factor required 
for preliminary injunctive relief” on the causation question.68  The trial judge honed in on 
the fact that the State’s expert testimony had not been peer reviewed or published, and 
that no one outside the lawsuit had validated the expert’s work. 69   In denying the 
preliminary injunction, the court held that even when the judge sits as fact-finder, Rule 
702 standards must still be met. 
 
II. THE DISPUTE IN HOBBY LOBBY, AND THE SCIENTIFIC VIEWS THAT WERE THE 
BASIS FOR THE DECISION 
 
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 
requiring strict scrutiny when a neutral law of general applicability “substantially 
burden[s] a person’s exercise of religion.” 70   RFRA was amended in 2000 by the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), to define “exercise of 
                                                 
62 See FED. R. EVID. 702.  
63 FED. R. EVID. 702, supra note 58. 
64 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995); see supra note 58, for 
a list of various additional factors that have been developed by other courts.  
65 Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, 565 F.3d 769 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that the state was unlikely to establish 
at trial that land application of poultry waste might present an imminent and substantial danger to health or 
the environment, as required for relief under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and also 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction based on a conclusion 
that the state’s witness testimony was unreliable and entitled to little weight). 
66 Id. at 780.  
67 Id. at 781. 
68 Id. at 775.  
69 Id. at 780. 
70 Hobby Lobby, 134 U.S. at 2754; see also 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (2012). 
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religion” broadly as any exercise of religion, “whether or not compelled by, or central to, 
a system of religious belief,”71 which is to be “construed in favor of a broad protection of 
religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the 
Constitution.”72   
The Hobby Lobby plaintiffs claimed that the 2010 Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (the Act),73 a federal law that aimed to overhaul the United States 
insurance system, violated their religious freedom rights under RFRA. 74   While 
lawmakers who passed the Act felt it would reform the healthcare system and give 
uninsured Americans access to affordable and quality healthcare,75 the law for a number 
of reasons caused a political uproar.76  Many Republicans alleged that the Act, dubbed 
“Obamacare,” was a socialized healthcare program that would lead to reductions in 
quality of care and impose penalties on small businesses.77  Republicans in the House 
have voted more than 50 times to repeal the law.78  Some commentators view the Hobby 
Lobby litigation as politically motivated, just one of many lawsuits brought by 
ideologically driven plaintiffs who are part of a broader effort to repeal the controversial 
Act.79  
One of the key provisions in the Act is Section 2713, which prohibits group health 
insurance plans from imposing cost-sharing requirements, such as deductibles or 
copayments, for a number of “preventive health services” including “preventive care and 
screenings” for women.80 Congress did not define “preventive care” in the Act but left it 
up to the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) to determine what it 
would encompass.81  
                                                 
71 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2015). In 2006, the Supreme Court upheld the Constitutionality of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal et al., 
125 S. Ct. 1846 (2006). 
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000CC-3 (2012). 
73 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012). 
74 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. is a nationwide chain of arts and crafts stores 
owned by Christians; Conestoga Wood Specialties is a manufacturing company owned by Mennonites. Id. 
at 2764, 2765. 
75 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, §5000, 124 Stat. 588, 120-1020 (2010). 
76 Susan Cornwell, Republicans Vow to Keep Fighting Obamacare, Despite Court Ruling, REUTERS, June 
25, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/republicans-vow-keep-fighting-obamacare-despite-court-ruling-
160811704.html.  
77 Id; see also James Surowiecki, The Business End of Obamacare, THE NEW YORKER, OCT. 14, 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/10/14/the-business-end-of-obamacare. 
78 Kathleen Miller & Terrence Dopp, Core of Obamacare Would Be Repealed in Bill Passed by U.S. 
House, BLOOMBERG POLITICS, Oct. 23, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-10-
23/core-of-obamacare-would-be-repealed-in-bill-passed-by-u-s-house. 
79 See Stephanie Mencimer, Are You There God? Its Me, Hobby Lobby, MOTHER JONES, Mar. 21, 2014,  
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/03/hobby-lobby-supreme-court-obamacare; See also Sam 
Baker, Is SCOTUS Already Expanding on the Hobby Lobby Ruling?, THE ATLANTIC, July 7, 2014, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/is-scotus-already-expanding-on-the-hobby-lobby-
ruling/440931/; Dan Diamond, Hobby Lobby Isn't the End: Four Other Anti-ACA Lawsuits to Watch, 
ADVISORY BOARD: DAILY BRIEFING BLOG (June 25, 2014), http://www.advisory.com/daily-
briefing/blog/2014/06/hobby-lobby-isnt-the-end-other-anti-obamacare-lawsuits-still-loom.  
80 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2015). 
81 Id. 
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HRSA adopted the evidence-based recommendations of the Institute of Medicine, 
an independent non-profit dedicated to health policy and research that is essentially the 
“health arm” of the National Academy of Sciences. 82   The Institute recommended 
coverage of eight preventive services, including all FDA-approved methods of 
contraception,83 without cost sharing. 
The Hobby Lobby plaintiffs objected to their corporations providing health 
insurance coverage to female employees for four specific contraceptives, which they 
believed were abortifacients.84  The plaintiffs held the religious belief that life begins at 
fertilization,85 and that any contraceptive method that disrupts the fertilized egg is an 
abortifacient.86  The Supreme Court summarized the plaintiffs’ position as objecting to 
any contraceptive that prevents “an already fertilized egg from developing any further by 
inhibiting its attachment to the uterus.” 87   Though not objecting to coverage for all 
contraceptives, 88 the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs complained about these four: Ella (ulipristal 
                                                 
82 DIPTI SINGH, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, SUMMARY OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION ON 
THE ACA’S CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE REQUIREMENT, (July 7, 2014), 
http://www.healthlaw.org/publications/browse-all-publications/Hobby-lobby-analysis#. 
83 Id. A contraceptive is “an agent to prevent conception.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, available 
online at WestlawNext (database updated November 2014). 
84 Hobby Lobby, 134  U.S. at 2759. The Court did not define the terms ”abortifacient” or “abortion.” 
According to Stedman’s Medical Dictionary abortifacient is defined as “1. Producing abortion 2. An agent 
that produces abortion.” STEDMAN’S supra note 83. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary defines abortion as “1. 
Expulsion from the uterus of an embryo or fetus before viability (20 weeks' gestation [18 weeks after 
fertilization] or fetal weight less than 500 g). A distinction made between abortion and premature birth is 
that premature infants are those born after the stage of viability but before 37 weeks' gestation. Abortion 
may be either spontaneous (occurring from natural causes) or induced (artificially or therapeutically). 2. 
The arrest of any action or process before its normal completion.” Id. Underlying the scientific and 
“values” debates about contraception, contraceptives and abortion are often conflicting definitions for the 
core terms.  
85 Hobby Lobby 2764–66.  Stedman’s Medical Dictionary defines fertilization as, “The process beginning 
with penetration of the secondary oocyte by the sperm and completed by fusion of the male and female 
pronuclei.” See STEDMAN’S supra note 83. 
86 First Amended Verified Complaint ¶30, Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 5:12-CV-
06744-MSG (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2013) (“The Mennonite Church teaches that taking life which includes 
anything that terminates a fertilized embryo is intrinsic evil and a sin against God to which they are held 
accountable. Therefore, abortion and any abortifacient contraception that may cause an abortion is equally 
objectionable to the Plaintiff”); Verified Complaint at ¶7, Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, 870 F.Supp.2d 1278 
(W.D. Okla. 2012) (No. CIV-12-1000-HE) (“The Green family’s religious beliefs forbid them from 
participating in, providing access to, paying for, training others to engage in, or otherwise supporting 
abortion-causing drugs and devices”). Note that the plaintiffs “have no religious objection to providing 
coverage for non-abortion causing contraceptive drugs and devices.” Id. at ¶57. 
87 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2754. The Court also noted that federal regulations define pregnancy as 
beginning at implantation, citing 62 Fed. Reg. 8611 (1997); 45 CFR §46.202(f) (2013). Id. at n.7. The 
technical terms for attachment to the uterus is “implantation”, as defined in Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 
“1. Attachment of the blastocyst to the endometrium, and its subsequent embedding in the compact layer, 
occurring 6–7 days after fertilization of the oocyte in humans.” STEDMAN’S supra note 83. 
88 The plaintiff’s views were markedly different from the views of traditional Catholics, represented by the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), which held an even more stringent view and 
lobbied adamantly against the entire slate of 20 contraceptives. The USCCB noted in its campaign against 
the mandate that contraception “should not be considered part of preventive healthcare because pregnancy 
is not a disease.” See Love and Sexuality, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-
teachings/what-we-believe/love-and-sexuality/index.cfm#contraception (Last visited Jan. 1, 2016). The 
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acetate), Plan B (levonorgestrel), and two types of intrauterine devices (IUDs): ParaGard 
(or copper IUDs) and Mirena and Skyla (or levonorgestrel-releasing IUDs).89  
 
III. THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE SCIENTIFIC VIEWS OFFERED BY THE HOBBY 
LOBBY PLAINTIFFS: NO RULE 702 REVIEW BY ANY COURT 
 
Despite the mandate of Rule 702, there was no Rule 702 review by any federal 
court in the Hobby Lobby litigation.  There was only an indirect reference made to the 
fact that the plaintiff proffered no evidence showing that the four contraceptives in 
question were abortifacients in a dissenting opinion by 10th Circuit Judge Mary Beck 
Briscoe.90  Judge Briscoe opined that the plaintiffs did not meet their evidentiary burden 
to show as a scientific matter that these contraceptives were abortifacients.91  Without 
mentioning Rule 702, the dissent was clearly troubled by the absence of valid scientific 
evidence.  
Specifically, Judge Briscoe noted that “there is no evidentiary support in the record 
for plaintiffs’ allegations that the objected-to contraceptive drugs and devices actually 
have the potential to prevent implantation of fertilized eggs.” 92   While there was 
“agreement among the parties and amici that intrauterine devices have such potential,” by 
contrast, she noted, “the same cannot be said about the challenged contraceptive drugs 
(e.g., Plan B and Ella).”93  She concluded: “In light of these evidentiary deficiencies, I 
fail to see how plaintiffs could reasonably be said to have carried their burden of 
establishing their entitlement to a preliminary injunction.”94  
 
IV. SCIENTIFIC OPINIONS ABOUT WHETHER THE FOUR HOBBY LOBBY METHODS 
ARE ABORTIFACIENTS 
 
The Hobby Lobby plaintiffs took the position that life begins at fertilization,95 and 
that the four methods of contraception, which they objected to, prevent implantation of a 
fertilized egg. 96   In this section, I first look at scientific opinions on reproduction, 
specifically opinions about the process of ovulation, how an egg gets fertilized, how 
implantation occurs, and at what stage in the reproductive process scientists define the 
beginning of pregnancy.   I then review each of the four Hobby Lobby contraceptives in 
                                                                                                                                                 
USCCB, joined forces with the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs in opposing the mandate, see, e.g., Brief of the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amicus Curiae in Support of Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., et al., Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (Jan. 28, 
2014), http://www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/amicus-briefs/upload/amicus-13-354-13-356-sebelius-
hobby-lobby-conestoga-wood.pdf.  
89 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762–63, n.6; see also Brief for Petitioners at 10 n.4, Sebelius v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354). 
90 Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1164–65 (10th Cir. 2013) (Briscoe, J., dissenting).  
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id.  
94 Id.   
95 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–66. 
96 Id.  
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terms of their mechanism of action—specifically, scientific opinions about (1) how the 
contraceptive works, and (2) whether the contraceptive acts on the process of ovulation, 
acts before or after fertilization, or acts by interfering with implantation of the blastocyst 
in the endometrial lining of the uterus.  
 
A. The Reproductive Process, Pregnancy, and Contraception 
 
The first step in the reproductive process is ovulation.  Each month inside a 
woman’s ovaries, eggs grow in small, fluid-filled sacs called follicles. 97   During 
ovulation, one of the eggs erupts from the follicle, typically about two weeks before a 
woman starts menstruation.98  After the egg exits the follicle, the follicle develops into 
something called the corpus luteum. 99   The corpus luteum releases a hormone that 
thickens the lining of the uterus, “getting it ready for the egg.”100  Essentially, in order for 
the egg to be fertilized by the sperm, the follicles must burst open in order for the eggs to 
travel to the fallopian tube.101  
Normally, only one egg is released at one time, but occasionally two or more erupt 
during the menstrual cycle.”102  Typically, an egg erupts from a woman’s ovary on the 
14th to 16th day of the approximately 28-day menstrual cycle.103  “At ovulation, the mucus 
in the cervix becomes more fluid and more elastic, allowing the sperm to enter the uterus 
rapidly.”104  The sperm, upon entering the vagina, move through the cervix into the uterus 
and toward the “funnel-shaped end of the fallopian tube—the usual site of 
fertilization.”105  When a sperm penetrates the egg, fertilization results.106  
The next step is that the fertilized egg (zygote) “divides repeatedly as it moves 
down the fallopian tube to the uterus.  First, the zygote becomes a solid ball of cells.  
Then it becomes a hollow ball of cells called a blastocyst.  Inside the uterus, the 
blastocyst implants in the wall of the uterus, where it develops an embryo attached to a 
placenta and surrounded by fluid-filled membranes.”107  
There is a general consensus in the medical community that pregnancy begins upon 
implantation of the blastocyst in the uterine wall.  As a group of 15 doctors, scientists, 
and medical professional associations wrote in a brief to the Supreme Court, 
“[p]regnancy is established only upon the conclusion of such implantation.” 108  This 
definition follows the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ definition: 
the term “pregnancy” refers to the period between the implantation of the embryo in the 
                                                 
97 THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 1435–37 (Mark Beers ed., Simon & Shuster 2nd Home 











108 Brief of Physicians For Reproductive Health, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12, 
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct 2751 (2013) (No. 13-354). 
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uterus and childbirth.109   
There is a clear scientific distinction between contraceptives and abortifacients.  
“[A] ‘contraceptive’ refers to that which prevents fertilization of an egg or prevents 
implantation of a fertilized egg—in other words, it prevents a pregnancy from taking 
place.” 110   On the other hand, an abortifacient “works to disturb an embryo already 
implanted in the uterine lining, which necessarily occurs after a pregnancy has been 
established.”111   
While there is a consensus view for how the four Hobby Lobby contraceptives 
likely act to block reproduction, researchers have had some difficulty, depending on the 
particular contraceptive at issue, in fully explaining the occasional pregnancy. 112  
Research knowledge is constrained by a several factors such as the inability of scientists 
to identify the exact moment of fertilization of the egg and the difficulty of finding 
research subjects (not many women of child-bearing age are willing to have their 
reproductive systems flushed in order to be studied). 113   There are also ethical 
considerations because, in certain cases, testing would involve a human embryo.114  
Another factor adding to the difficulty of determining how a particular 
contraceptive works is the general instability in the process of fertilization and 
implantation.  Loss of fertilized eggs is actually the norm.  In healthy women not 
practicing any method of contraception, an estimated 70 percent of fertilized eggs are lost 




 Ella is a pill that contains 30 mg of ulipristal acetate (UPA).  Its product label 
recommends use within 120 hours of unprotected sex.116  The strong scientific consensus 
is that Ella works by inhibiting ovulation,117 and that Ella’s main component, ulipristal 
acetate, can prevent ovulation and even delay ovulation on the day of the LH peak for 
twenty-four to forty-eight hours after the pill is taken.118   
                                                 
109 Maurizio Guida, et al., Emergency Contraception: An Updated Review, 1 TRANSLATIONAL MED. @ 
UNISA 271, 273 (2011). 
110 Brief of Physicians For Reproductive Health, supra note 108, at 13. 
111 Id. 
112 E.g., Maria Elena Ortiz & Horacio B. Croxatto, Copper-T Intrauterine Device and Levonorgestrel 
Intrauterine System: Biological Bases of Their Mechanism of Action, 75 CONTRACEPTION S16, S18 (2007) 
(discussing in Table 3 that the number of control women was 111 and women with IUDs was even lower at 
56 in the studies looking at the recovery of ova. This is just one example of the very few number of events 
that have been directly studied in human females). 
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
115 See CAROL COUGHLIN, ET AL. Recurrent Implantation Failure: Definition and Management 28 
REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 14, 15 (2014) (stating that because the probability for an embryo to 
successfully implant is only approximately 30%, the probability of it failing to implant is approximately 
70%). 
116 Association of Reproductive Health Professionals, The Facts About Emergency Contraception, (Dec. 
2011), http://www.arhp.org/publications-and-resources/clinical-fact-sheets/facts-about-ec. 
117 Ortiz, supra note 112. 
118 Kristina Gemzell Danielsson, Cecilia Berger & P.G.L. Lalitkumar, Emergency Contraception—
Mechanisms of Action, 87 CONTRACEPTION 300, 302 (2013) (“…prior to the LH rise, UPA inhibited 100 
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There is a minority view that Ella works by impacting endometrial development.119  
Endometrial tissue affects whether an egg can properly implant. 120  On that basis, an 
argument is sometimes raised that Ella may affect post-fertilization implantation. 121  
However, when used at the recommended dose and timing for emergency contraception, 
no effect on the endometrium has been seen.122  
 
C. Plan B (Levonorgestrel or “LNG ECP”) 
 
Levonorgestrel is the scientific name for the pill called “Plan B” and other 
hormonal pills that contain 1.5 mg LNG.  It is a “synthetic version of the naturally-
occurring hormone progesterone.”123  Plan B works by inhibiting ovulation.124  The U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Plan B packaging with a statement that a 
post-fertilization effect is possible.125  A reporter for the New York Times investigating 
the issue of potentially-faulty FDA labeling of emergency contraceptives, such as Plan B, 
said that the newspaper had reviewed “hundreds of pages of approval process 
documents” but “found no discussion of evidence supporting implantation effects.”126  
Plan B’s maker—Barr Pharmaceuticals, later acquired by Teva Pharmaceuticals—
asked the FDA not to list an implantation effect on the label.127   While the FDA declined 
to comment as to why the company’s request had been denied,128  at least some experts 
                                                                                                                                                 
percent of follicular ruptures…when the size of the leading follicle was >/=18 mm, follicular rupture failed 
to occur within 5-6 days following treatment from 44 percent to 56 percent. Even on the day of the LH 
peak, UPA could delay ovulation from 24-48 hrs…”). See also Kate McKeage & James D. Croxtall, 
Ulipristal Acetate: A Review of Its Use in Emergency Contraception, 71 DRUGS 935, 935–36 (2011) (“The 
principal effect of ulipristal acetate is to inhibit or delay ovulation. This effect may result from the drug's 
ability to delay the onset of luteinizing hormone (LH) surge or postpone LH peak if LH surge has started, 
or possibly by a direct inhibitory effect on follicular rupture, when administered in the follicular phase 
(including just before ovulation).”). See also Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson, Mechanism of Action of 
Emergency Contraception, 82 CONTRACEPTION 404, 404-409 (2010). 
119 Bruno Mozzanega, MD, et al., Ulipristal Acetate: Critical Review About Endometrial and Ovulatory 
Effects  in Emergency Contraception, 21 REPRODUCTIVE SCIENCES 678, 678–79, (2014). 
120 Id. 
121 The Hobby Lobby plaintiffs complained that Ella and Plan B worked similarly to the abortion drug RU 
486 or Mifepristone. See Verified Complaint ¶¶54-55, Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, No. CIV-12-1000-HE 
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 12, 2012) (Trial Pleading); See also First Amended Verified Complaint ¶46, Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 5:12-CV-06744-MSG (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2013) (Trial Pleading). 
However, unlike ELLA Ella and Plan B, mifepristone acts on eggs already implanted in the uterus by 
affecting progesterone activity and causing uterine contractions. See Label for mifepristone posted on U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration website, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2004/020687s010-lbl.pdf. 
122 Gemzell-Danielsson, supra note 118, at 304. 
123 Brief of Physicians For Reproductive Health, supra note 108, at 8. 
124 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics (FIGO), Statement on Mechanisms of Action for 
Emergency Contraception (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.figo.org/sites/default/files/uploads/MOA_FINAL_2011_ENG.pdf 
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hold the view that the FDA required an implantation mechanism on the label because of 
endometrial effects, even though such effects do not interfere with implantation: 
 
[D]aily birth control pills, some of which contain Plan B’s active 
ingredient, appear to alter the endometrium, the lining of the uterus into 
which fertilized eggs implant. Altering the endometrium has not been 
proven to interfere with implantation . . . scientists say that unlike the 
accumulating doses of daily birth control pills, the one-shot dose in 
morning-after pills does not have time to affect the uterine lining.129  
 
The most up-to-date scientific consensus suggests that there is no meaningful 
scientific evidence proving that Plan B interferes with the implantation of a fertilized egg.  
In March 2011, the International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics (FIGO) 
published a joint statement that levonorgestrel-only emergency contraceptive pills (LNG 
ECPs) work by impairing ovulation, and do not inhibit implantation.130   The statement 
summarized key findings from numerous scientific studies about levonorgestrel’s effects 
on ovulation, sperm, implantation of the blastocyst and pregnancy: 
 Ovulation: The FIGO statement cited eight studies that showed “strong direct 
evidence that LNG ECPs prevent or delay ovulation.131 This is the primary 
mechanism of action for LNG ECPs.”132   
 Implantation: The FIGO statement cited a variety of studies to rebut the 
contention that LNG ECPs affect implantation:133  
 Two studies that confirmed a woman’s cycle day via “hormonal analysis” 
compared to other studies, which “used a women’s self-reported day.”134   
“In these studies no pregnancies occurred in women who took ECPs 
before ovulation; while pregnancies occurred only in women who took 
ECPs on or after the day of ovulation, providing evidence that ECPs were 
unable to prevent implantation.”135  
 A number of studies “have evaluated whether ECPs produce changes in 
the histological and bio-chemical characteristics of the endometrium.  
Most studies show that LNG ECPs have no such effect on the 
endometrium, indicating that they have no mechanism to prevent 
implantation.  One of these studies found that following administration of 
double the standard dose of LNG, there are only minor or no alterations in 
endometrial receptivity.  One study found a single altered endometrial 
parameter only when LNG was administered prior to the LH surge, at a 
time when ECPs inhibit ovulation.”136   In this latter study, endometrial 
                                                 
129 Id. 
130 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. The FIGO statement cites to 17 
studies published in scientific journals to support this conclusion. 
131 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
132 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
133 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
134 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
135 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
136 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
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function being altered made no difference if the drug inhibited ovulation 
altogether, because fertilization of an egg cannot take place without 
ovulation.137   
 One study that showed LNG emergency contraceptive pills “did not 
prevent the attachment of human embryos to a simulated (in vitro) 
endometrial environment.”138    
 Two studies involving animals “demonstrated that LNG ECPs did not 
prevent implantation of the fertilized egg in the endometrium.”139  
 Sperm: The FIGO statement noted that “contradictory results exist regarding 
whether LNG taken post-coitally and in doses used for ec (emergency 
contraception) affects sperm function.”140   The FIGO statement, citing two 
studies, said “early studies suggested that LNG ECPs interfere with sperm 
motility by thickening cervical mucus.” 141    The statement cautioned , 
however, that “two in vitro studies found that LNG in doses used for ec has no 
direct effect on sperm function.  Recent in vivo studies found no effect of 
LNG on the number of viable sperm found in the female genital tract 24-28 
hours after taking LNG.  Interference in sperm migration is also a possible 
explanation in women who took LNG ECP before ovulation, but had 
documented follicle rupture in the following 5 days, yet did not get 
pregnant.”142   The FIGO statement concluded, “[g]iven these results, this 
mechanism of action is still uncertain and warrants further studies.”143  
 Effect on Pregnancy: The FIGO Statement concluded that LNG taken as an 
emergency contraceptive has no apparent effect on pregnancy: “Two studies 
of women who became pregnant in cycles when they took LNG ECPs found 
no difference between pregnancy outcomes of women who had taken LNG 
ECPs and those who had not.  Variables included miscarriage, birth weight, 
malformations, and sex ratio, indicating that LNG ECPs have no effect on an 
established pregnancy even at very early stages.”144  
Based on 24 referenced studies, FIGO reached the conclusion that “inhibition or 
delay of ovulation is LNG ECP’s principal and possibly only mechanism of action.”145   
Further:   
 
Review of the evidence suggests that LNG ECPs cannot prevent 
implantation of a fertilized egg. Language on implantation should not be 
included in LnG ecP product labeling. The fact that LNG ECPs have no 
demonstrated effect on implantation explains why they are not 100% 
effective in preventing pregnancy, and are less effective the later they are 
                                                 
137 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
138 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
139 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
140 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
141 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
142 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
143 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
144 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
145 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
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taken. Women should be given a clear message that LNG ECPs are more 
effective the sooner they are taken. LNG ECPs do not interrupt a 
pregnancy (by any definition of the beginning of pregnancy). However, 
LNG ECPs can prevent abortions by reducing unwanted pregnancy.146 
 
D. Intrauterine devices (IUD): copper-releasing IUD and levonorgestrel-releasing 
IUD 
 
Two of the four contraceptives at issue in Hobby Lobby are IUDs, one of which 
releases copper and the other releases the hormone levonorgestrel. 147   A number of 
studies suggest that the mechanism of IUD effectiveness typically occurs before 
implantation: “The common belief that the usual mechanism of action of IUDs in women 
is destruction of embryos in the uterus is not supported by empirical evidence.”148 The 
usual mechanism of action in IUDs is by preventing fertilization (“preventing the 
encounter of healthy gametes and the formation of viable embryos”).149  Even if sperm do 
reach the site of fertilization, there is evidence to suggest that they do not fertilize the egg 
because of endometrial glycodelin secretion, which are substances secreted into the 
female reproductive tract by the endometrium.150 On the other hand, there have been 
instances of fertilized eggs, and while interference with a fertilized egg may be 
“exceptional” in the presence of a copper or hormonal IUD, it can occur, even if rarely.151  
Overall, the bulk of research supports the conclusion that IUDs do not interfere with the 
reproductive process after fertilization has taken place.152  Nonetheless, there is not full 
consensus that IUDs prevent pregnancy by acting only before fertilization.153  
 
1. ParaGard (copper-releasing IUD) 
  
The consensus on the copper-releasing IUD is that it works as a contraceptive by 
preventing the sperm from reaching the fallopian tube to fertilize the ovum.154  Copper 
ions in ParaGard “stimulate an intrauterine inflammatory reaction that is cytotoxic to the 
                                                 
146 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
147 See Description of Terms, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Intrauterine Devices (IUDs): Access 
for Women in the U.S. (July 9, 2015), http://kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/intrauterine-devices-
iuds-access-for-women-in-the-u-s/. 
148 Ortiz, supra note 112, at S28.  
149 Ortiz, supra note 112, at S28. 
150 Ortiz, supra note 112, at S18. 
151 Ortiz, supra note 112, at S28. 
152 Gemzell-Danielsson, supra note 118, at 304. These conclusions refers to chronic use of IUDs, as 
distinguished from the situation when a copper IUD is used as an emergency contraception, with the 
expectation that it may prevent implantation due to copper's effect of altering molecules present in the 
endometrial lining of the uterus.  
153 See, e.g., Joseph B. Stanford & Rafael T. Mikolajczyk, Mechanisms of Action of Intrauterine Devices: 
Update and Estimation of Postfertilization Effects, 187 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL.1699, 1699 (2002).  
154 Anita Nelson, Safety, Efficacy and Patient Acceptability of the Copper T-380A Intrauterine 
Contraceptive Device, 4 CLINICAL MED. INSIGHTS: WOMEN’S HEALTH 35, 35 (2011).  
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sperm and phagocytizes [destroys] them; no viable spermatozoa remain in the 
endometrial cavity 18 hours after natural insemination.”155  
In short, copper is toxic to sperm and kills them before they reach the egg.156  As 
one study concluded about copper IUDs: “there is no evidence that the IUD works after 
implantation.”157  Further, “the evidence that IUDs do not work after fertilization by 
blocking implantation comes from several different experimental designs.”158  There are 
several indications from scientific studies that copper IUDs work before fertilization 
takes place:  
 “By studying ova retrieved during sterilization procedures from women who 
had mid cycle coitus, it was seen that none of the specimens from women 
using IUDs displayed normal cellular division indicating successful 
fertilization. However, 50 percent of the ova from the women who used no 
method showed such division.”159 
 “Similarly, no eggs were recovered from the uterine cavities of 56 IUD users 
within 132 hours after the LH peak compared to 4 eggs found in the 115 
control women.”160 
 “In addition, the fact that CuT380A [copper-releasing IUD] dramatically 
decreases ectopic pregnancy risks supports the fact that the site of action is 
before the fallopian tube—that fertilization is blocked.”161 
Also of note, recent studies “have revealed that the copper IUD decreases 
endometrial HOXA10 expression, which is essential for endometrial receptivity, but the 
clinical significance of those changes is not known.”162  However, this point is moot if 
there is no fertilization in the first place, and may be irrelevant to any Hobby Lobby 
scientific review. 
Finally, there is also an opposing view, albeit based on research almost 20 years old 
and with a very small set of data , that copper IUDs work both as a pre-fertilization 
spermicidal action and as a post-fertilization inhibition of uterine implantation.163  
 
2.  Mirena and Skyla (levonorgestrel-releasing IUD or LNG IUD) 
 
This type of IUD acts by releasing progestin, a synthetic steroid that is different 
from natural progesterone.164  These contraceptives interfere with the sperm’s ability to 
fertilize the egg.165 The general medical view is that LNG IUDs work with a similar 
                                                 
155 Id.  
156 Id. 
157 Id.  
158 Id. 
159 Id.  
160 Id.  
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163  Joseph A. Spinnato II MD, Mechanism of Action of Intrauterine Contraceptive Devices and Its Relation 
to Informed Consent, 176 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL., 503, 503–506 (1997). 
164 Id.  
164 Abdelhamid M. Attia, Magdy M. Ibrahim & Ahmed M. Abou-Setta,  Role of the Levonorgestrel 
Intrauterine System in Effective Contraception 7 Patient Pref. and Adherence 777, 778 (2013). 
165 Ortiz, supra note 112, at S18. 
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mechanism of action as copper-releasing IUDs, that is, they prevent fertilization. 166   
However, just as with the copper IUD, there is not full scientific agreement.  One review 
of the scientific literature on the mechanism of action for IUDs noted that in rare 
instances, LNG-IUDs may interfere with a fertilized egg, as suggested in a study by 
Alvarez et al., where there was one fertilized egg recovered from a LNG IUD user.167  
 
V.  UNDER RULE 702, WOULD A COURT HAVE ADMITTED EVIDENCE THAT THESE 
FOUR METHODS ARE ABORTIFACIENTS? 
 
Under the court’s gatekeeping function—which applies to all expert testimony168—
the trial judge assesses whether scientific opinions are admissible, using the non-
exclusive standards of Rule 702.169  The inquiry focuses on whether expert opinions are 
sufficiently reliable to be admitted before any fact-finding takes place (whether the fact-
finder is the jury or a judge).170  The “focus, of course, must be solely on principles and 
methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.”171   
Admissibility is not equivalent to a fact-finding conclusion.  Thus, competing 
opinions can be admitted so long as they meet the Rule 702 requirements.172  Proponents 
“do not have to demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
assessments of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that their opinions are reliable. . . The evidentiary 
requirement of reliability is lower than the merits standard of correctness.”173  
There are four components to a Rule 702 analysis, although the components can be 
overlapping.174  For purposes of this review, I assume that one or more of the authors 
from the articles cited in Section IV would testify on whether the four contraceptives are 
abortifacients.  On that basis, I approach the Rule 702 analyses as follows.   
First, in Section A below, I discuss admissibility under Rule 702(a) and show that 
identifying a qualified expert is not likely to be an impediment to admissibility of 
opinions contesting the Hobby Lobby beliefs about the four contraceptives.  
Second, in Section B below, I analyze the Rule 702(b), (c) and (d) factors for each 
contraceptive.  The main reason for analyzing those factors together is that in this 
situation, the Rule 702 factors—testimony based on sufficient facts, the product of 
reliable principles and methods, and the reliable application of those principles and 
methods—are highly overlapping.  Hobby Lobby, unlike Daubert, does not involve the 
application of scientific principles and methods to a single personal injury plaintiff.  The 
                                                 
166 Ortiz, supra note 112, at S28. 
167 Ortiz, supra note 112, at S27. 
168 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1178 (1999).   
169 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
170 Id. 
171 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.   
172 FED. R. EVID. 702, supra note 58. 
173 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994). See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995) (scientific experts might be permitted to testify if they 
could show that the methods they used were also employed by “a recognized minority of scientists in their 
field.”). 
174 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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principles and methods shown in the scientific literature are not dependent on a particular 
individual but rather apply more generally to a widespread group of individuals.  Clearly, 
this was a case where the plaintiffs did not have individualized medical conditions; rather 
they made general medical and scientific claims in their briefs to the court.  Thus, the 
court, in exercising its gatekeeper function, would evaluate expert testimony as it is 
applied generally to the claims at hand, rather than to a specific person. 
Here, the focus is on the reliability of scientific data and methods for studying the 
general mechanism of action in a given contraceptive, and whether an expert’s opinion 
shows that she reliably applied scientific principles and methods to her conclusions about 
the mechanism of action in a particular contraceptive.  As has been recognized by others, 
there is considerable redundancy among those factors, and treating them as completely 
independent would be pushing distinctions that may not exist.175  
 
A. Will The Expert’s Specialized Knowledge Help The Trier Of Fact To Determine 
Whether Each Contraceptive Is An Abortifacient Under Rule 702(A)? 
 
How each contraceptive works is not a matter of everyday experience or intuition—
it is a matter of “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”176  The authors of 
the scientific articles cited in Section IV were qualified by education, training and 
experience.  The authors hold a medical degree and/or a doctoral degree in an appropriate 
science, and specialize in gynecology and/or reproductive health.  If one or more of these 
scientists were called to testify at trial, their opinions about contraceptives would likely 
pass muster under Rule 702(a) because each of them has the requisite “scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge” to help the trier of fact understand a key issue: 
whether a particular contraceptive is an abortifacient, the “fact in issue.”177   
Even when a witness does not have the strongest of credentials, it would be 
unusual—indeed, possibly an abuse of the trial court’s discretion—for an M.D. practicing 
or researching in the area of gynecology or obstetrics to be barred from testifying on the 
basis of lack of specialized knowledge.178  Disputes over the strength of qualifications 
and credentials usually go to the weight that a fact-finder gives the expert testimony, 
rather than to the admissibility of the testimony. 179  As the Daubert Court noted, 
“[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction 
on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but 
admissible evidence.”180 
                                                 
175See, e.g., Munia Jabbar, Overcoming Daubert’s Shortcomings in Criminal Trials: Making the Error Rate 
the Primary Factor in Daubert’s Validity Inquiry, 85 NYU LAW REV. 2034–64 (2010); DAVID L. 
FAIGMAN, ET AL., 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 20 (2d 
ed. 2002).  
176 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
177 FED. F. EVID. 702(a).  
178 Weinstein, supra note 29 at § 702.04(1)(a). 
179 See, e.g., Jahn v. Equine Services, PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 393 n.8 (6th Cir. 2000); Arkansas Game and Fish 
Comm’n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
180 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. 
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In short, Rule 702(a) would not be an impediment to offering the scientific 
opinions discussed in Section IV because those rendering the opinions have the required 
specialized knowledge.  
 
B. Would the Court Have Admitted Evidence that Ella Is or Is Not an Abortifacient? 
 
The overwhelming view from medical literature and numerous peer-reviewed 
scientific studies is that Ella works by inhibiting ovulation—a process that takes place 
before fertilization and before implantation of a fertilized egg.  That conclusion hinges on 
scientific facts and data subjected to peer review.  Moreover, as shown in Section IV, 
there is virtually no reliable basis for disputing that this opinion is the product of reliable 
scientific principles and methods, which were reliably applied to the research.  A court 
should easily admit those opinions about Ella under Rule 702.   
The question is whether a court would admit the contrary opinion, that Ella works 
by impacting endometrial tissue and that on that basis, there is an effect on whether a 
fertilized egg can properly implant.  That opinion is a tougher call both because (1) it is 
not a generally accepted view of how Ella works, (2) the opinion reflects an analytical 
gap between principles and facts, and (3) it could be argued that the opinion does not 
have sufficient facts or data to support it.   
In any event, there is little question that a scientific opinion would be admitted 
which is contrary to the position offered by the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs (that Ella acts on a 
fertilized egg and that it prevents implantation of a fertilized egg).   
 
C. Would the Court Have Admitted Evidence that Plan B (pill form of 
Levonorgestrel) Is or Is Not an Abortifacient? 
 
Although Plan B has a checkered political history, the most recent prominent 
scientific research concludes with strong direct evidence that the pill prevents or delays 
ovluation and does not interfere with fertilization or affect implantation of the blastocyst. 
The FIGO statement cited eight studies that showed strong direct evidence that Plan B 
prevents or delays ovulation and is the primary mechanism of action for this 
contraceptive.181  As shown in the FIGO Statement, there are two studies that conclude 
emergency contraception does not affect implantation. 182  These two studies were 
published in respected peer-reviewed scientific journals, one in Contraception, and the 
other, in Human Reproduction.183  These are professional journals targeted to a medical 
audience and not concerned about the politics of contraceptives.   
For example, Contraception’s editorial statement says its aim is to “advance 
reproductive health through the rapid publication of the best and most interesting new 
scholarship regarding contraception and related fields such as abortion.”184  It is the 
official journal of the Association of Reproductive Health Professionals. 185   Human 
                                                 
181 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
182 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
183 International Federation of Gynecology & Obstetrics, supra note 124. 
184 CONTRACEPTION, http://www.contraceptionjournal.org/content/authorinfo#idp1314592 (last visited Nov. 
11, 2014). 
185 Id. 
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Reproduction is a similar journal published by Oxford, dedicated to “full-length, peer-
reviewed papers reporting original research, concise clinical case histories, as well as 
opinions and debates on topical issues.”186  Thus, by relying on research published in 
high quality medical journals, the opinion that Levonorgestrel is not an abortifacient is 
the product of reliable scientific research principles and methods.  
Furthermore, these opinions are based on sufficient facts or data.  All of the studies 
cited involved testing a hypothesis with data and analysis, and comparing the data with a 
control group.  The tests were not funded by political action groups but rather were 
conducted by independent researchers with funding by universities or government grants.  
The researchers were required by their journals to disclose whether they had any conflicts 
of interests in conducting the research. 
Indeed, each of these experts—as reflected in their publications and reports of their 
publications—has the ability to “give a dissertation or exposition of scientific . . . 
principles relevant to the case.”187  There is no question that this view of how Plan B 
works would be admissible.   
As with Ella, the question is whether an alternative view, supporting the position of 
the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs, would also be admitted.  An expert may point to the 
manufacturer’s own packaging statement, that a post-fertilization effect is possible, even 
though the FDA required the manufacturer to place that statement on the label over the 
manufacturer’s objection that the statement was not scientifically justified.  There is also 
the notion that Plan B may have endometrial effects, even if there is no direct evidence 
linking endometrial effects with disruption of implantation.  Thus, it is not likely that the 
Hobby Lobby plaintiffs’ view of the science would be admitted, but it is possible.  In that 
event, the fact-finder would receive both scientific views about how Plan B works and 
would have to evaluate which opinion about Plan B’s mechanism of action is more 
persuasive. 
 
D. Would the Court Have Admitted Evidence that IUDs Are or Are Not 
Abortifacients? 
 
The majority scientific view, based on facts and data published in well-regarded 
professional publications, is that IUDs work by preventing fertilization.188  Interference 
with the reproductive process after fertilization has taken place is exceptional in the 
presence of a copper or LNG IUD.189  Opinions that IUDS do not act on fertilized eggs 
and do not disrupt implantation of a fertilized egg would be based on scientific facts and 
data presented in reputable scientific publications, and based on scientific principles and 
methods subject to peer review.   
While the view that IUDs interfere with the reproductive process after fertilization 
has taken place is not widely held, there are scientific articles that analyze research and 
reach this conclusion.  With respect to copper-releasing IUDs, the opinion could be 
offered based on scientific analysis of research data that copper IUDs work both as a pre-
                                                 
186 HUMAN REPRODUCTION, http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/humrep/about.html (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2014). 
187 FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory committee’s note, 1972 Proposed rules. 
188 Ortiz, supra note 112. 
189 Ortiz, supra note 112. 
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fertilization spermicidal action and as a post-fertilization inhibition of uterine 
implantation.  While the research is not current and the opinion not broadly held, 
nonetheless under Rule 702’s focus on “sufficient facts or data” and “reliable principles 
and methods” it is likely that this opinion would be admitted.   
With respect to LNG IUDs, while the general medical view is that these IUDs work 
by preventing fertilization, there is not full scientific agreement.  Some of the 
disagreement is based on studies with a small number of patients, which may jeopardize 
the reliability of such opinions under Rule 702, with its emphasis on “sufficient facts or 
data” and “reliable principles and methods.”  However, it is generally agreed that studies 
of IUD effects are hard to complete on large number of patients, so opinions based on a 
small number of patients could be admitted.190  
In short, opinions that IUDs, whether copper-releasing or LNG-releasing, work 
before fertilization takes place are the prevailing scientific view and would likely be 
admitted under Rule 702.  It is also likely that the countervailing view could also be 
admitted under Rule 702.  
 
VI. HOW WOULD THE HOBBY LOBBY DECISION CHANGE IF RULE 702 HAD BEEN 
APPLIED? 
 
If the trial court had performed a gatekeeping role, evidence that these four 
contested Hobby Lobby contraceptives were not abortifacients should have been 
admitted.  This is not to say that competing evidence, taking the contrary view, would not 
have also been admitted.191  Of course, those contending that the four contraceptives are 
abortifacients would have the opportunity to buttress their belief with scientific 
evidence.192  The judge then would evaluate “whether expert testimony is sufficiently 
reliable to be considered by the trier of fact.”193  Ultimately, the judge or jury would then 
weigh the competing evidence and make a factual determination of whether each 
challenged contraceptive is an abortifacient.  By neglecting the requirements of Rule 702, 
the Hobby Lobby trial and appellate judges apparently assumed that the four 
contraceptives at issue were abortifacients (with the exception of Judge Briscoe of the 
10th Circuit).   
The government’s failure to challenge Hobby Lobby’s premise that the 
contraceptives at issue were abortifacients should not dispose of the need for scientific 
proof.  It is fundamental in litigation that the plaintiff has the burden of proof on every 
element of a claim.  In both underlying Hobby Lobby cases, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
ACA imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ religious exercise because the Act 
mandated “coverage or access to coverage of abortion-causing drugs or devices . . . 
                                                 
190 Ortiz, supra note 112, at S17.  
191 FED. R. EVID. 702, supra note 58 (“When a trial court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert’s 
testimony is reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is unreliable.”); see 
also Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola, 161 F. 3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998).    
192 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F. 3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994)(holding that a party does not 
have to prove at the gatekeeping stage that its experts are correct, “they only have to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of evidence that their opinions are reliable . . . .The evidentiary requirement of reliability is 
lower than the merits standard of correctness”).    
193 FED. R. EVID. 702, supra note 58.  
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.”194  Moreover, the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs did not simply object that their religious 
beliefs prevented coverage of all contraceptives.  Rather, their claim focused on particular 
contraceptives that allegedly caused abortions.   Therefore, to prevail, the plaintiffs 
should have been required by the trial courts, and by any reviewing courts, to prove with 
scientific evidence that each contraceptive at issue actually behaved in the way the 
plaintiffs alleged.  Such proof was all the more vital in the context of a preliminary 
injunction, the procedure in both underlying cases, because a preliminary injunction is an 
“extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff 
is entitled to such relief.”195   In short, without the scientific foundation for showing 
whether the challenged contraceptives were indeed abortifacients, the plaintiffs failed to 
prove an essential element of their claim.  
In this vein, Fed. R. Evid. 706 provides a procedure for a trial judge to appoint an 
expert to assist the court with its deliberations, whether or not the parties do so: “On a 
party’s motion or on its own, the court may order the parties to show cause why expert 
witnesses should not be appointed and may ask the parties to submit nominations.  The 
court may appoint any expert that the parties agree on and any of its own choosing.  But 
the court may only appoint someone who consents to act.”196 
If Rule 702 had been applied, the trial courts would have admitted scientific 
evidence about the mechanism of action for the four methods of contraceptives.  That 
scientific evidence would become the basis to decide whether or not each method is an 
abortifacient, thereby providing expert scientific opinions for reaching a factual 
conclusion and properly challenging a major premise underlying the Hobby Lobby 
decisions.  
 
A. Impact On The “Substantial Burden” Analysis 
 
The finding that the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs’ claims were based on junk science 
would have a significant impact on the Court’s “substantial burden” analysis.  In Hobby 
Lobby, where First Amendment and statutory religious freedom guarantees were at issue, 
the Court decided that the challenged HHS regulations requiring contraceptive coverage 
“substantially burdened the exercise of religion.” 197 The Court held that there was a 
substantial burden 198  on Hobby Lobby and Conestoga because they “have religious 
objections to abortions.” 199   Thus, they believed that by complying, they would 
“facilitate[e] abortions,” but that “if they do not comply, they will pay a very heavy 
price—as much as $1.3 million per day, or about $475 million per year, in the case of one 
of the companies.”200 
                                                 
194 Complaint, Hobby Lobby, Inc. v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 4009450 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 12, 2012); First 
Amended Complaint, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 6181041 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 
2013) (making a similar allegation: that “Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit them from 
providing coverage for abortifacients and contraception with a possible abortifacient effect . . . .”). 
195 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). 
196 FED. R. EVID. 706. 
197 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id.  
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But a reexamination of the contraceptive mandate shows that, in fact, it did not 
actually infringe upon the corporations’ sincerely held beliefs.  If the trial court had 
applied Rule 702 to the Hobby Lobby respondents’ claims, the Supreme Court’s analysis 
could have totally changed in favor of the government.  At a minimum, the record would 
contain substantial opinion evidence that none of these four contraceptives are 
abortifacients.  In addition, it is possible that for two of the four contraceptives—Ella and 
Plan B—no contrary expert opinions would have been admitted.  Thus, it is likely that the 
case would have come before the Supreme Court with a factual finding below that at least 
some, and perhaps all, of the challenged contraceptives were not abortifacients, and thus 
could not possibly infringe upon the companies’ anti-abortion beliefs.  Such a factual 
finding would have been entitled to great deference by the Court. 
 
B. Does A Rule 702 Analysis Violate The Free Exercise Clause or RFRA? 
    
A search of Westlaw reveals that no case has ever asked the question whether a 
Rule 702 analysis violates the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA.  Under RFRA, the 
“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability.”201  The burdened person is entitled to 
an exemption unless the Government can demonstrate “that application of the burden to 
the person –1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest 2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”202 
Under a post-Daubert review of the facts, the government arguably has a much 
more compelling interest: to make sure that legal claims with scientific underpinnings are 
factually correct. We should not want our court systems to be filled with junk scientific 
claims about abortifacients, which would undermine the credibility of our legal system 
and set bad precedent.  Additionally, there would be equal protection concerns if courts 
were lax in allowing junk science into the courtroom in cases about women’s 
reproductive freedom, but were more diligent about policing junk science in other cases.  
Certainly, the government has a compelling interest in ensuring that women are treated 
equally in accordance with the due process and equal protection clauses of both the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.   
Furthermore, engaging in a Rule 702 analysis would not infringe on petitioners’ 
right to freely exercise their religious beliefs.  Rather, the analysis would simply show 
whether the underlying facts support a claim that religious exercise has been burdened: a 
religious belief against abortion, no matter how sincere and compelling, is irrelevant if 
the contraceptives in question are not, in fact, abortifacients.  
Even the dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court’s decision failed to fully analyze 
the lack of evidence under Rule 702.  On the one hand, Justice Ginsburg alluded to the 
fact there is a lack of evidence showing that plaintiffs will be substantially burdened.203  
She noted that “the Court barely pauses to inquire whether any burden imposed by the 
contraceptive coverage requirement is substantial.”204  But on the other hand, the analysis 
                                                 
201 Id.  
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
204 Id. 
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falls short because it focused on how much the plaintiffs will need to pay the government 
in fines if they do not comply with the law, rather than the moral burden, which the 
dissent—like the majority—presumes.205  It is that moral burden that is unsupported by 




Hobby Lobby is an example of how the Supreme Court neglected its own 
precedent.  The Court should have remanded the case to the lower courts for further fact-
finding, subject to a Rule 702 analysis, before reaching a decision about whether 
government action burdened religious beliefs where the alleged burden appears to be 
rooted in bad science.  Instead, by ignoring the faulty assumptions underlying the Hobby 
Lobby plaintiffs’ claims, the Court upset the important precedent of Daubert and 
reopened the risk of junk science in the courtroom.  
Furthermore, the Court’s decision may have consequences for public health policy 
in the United States and abroad.  Unfortunately, the Hobby Lobby decision reinforces 
medical myths that IUDs and emergency contraceptives are abortifacients.  These 
mistaken ideas could well undermine the ability of medical professionals to implement 
effective family planning outreach with safe and reliable forms of contraception. 206  
While this is not strictly a legal problem, courts have a responsibility to ensure that 
science is evaluated appropriately in the courtroom because decisions made inside the 
courtroom can have meaningful repercussions outside the courtroom as well.  Moreover, 
the Court’s precedent could lead lower courts to grant greater deference to religious 
plaintiffs’ erroneous beliefs on secular, scientific questions.207 
The Court is also setting a bad precedent and potentially disregarding the 
commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when it allows matters related to 
women’s bodies to be treated differently or with less scientific rigor in the courtroom.  
Why is it that Rule 702, which requires a trial judge to review all sorts of scientific 
testimony, is routinely applied in many different factual scenarios—from toxic torts to 
criminal cases involving DNA testing—but in this case, involving women’s reproductive 
choices, it was ignored?  
Of course, the initial responsibility to require scientific evidence, and then to apply 
Rule 702, lies with the trial judge.  In neither of the two cases that were part of the Hobby 
Lobby decision did the federal district judges raise the issue that the plaintiffs had not 
proffered one bit of scientific evidence to back up their claims. Furthermore, the 
government did not raise the scientific argument. It was only when the case arrived at the 
Supreme Court that attorneys representing various physician groups raised the scientific 
issues, albeit as amici curiae.208  It is unclear why the government did not raise the issue: 
was it out of concern that raising the claim’s lack of scientific validity might enrage 
religious conservatives? President Barack Obama was running a tough reelection 
                                                 
205 Id.  
206 Id. at 2788–89. 
207 Though the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs’ beliefs about abortion were religious, its belief that the 
contraceptives were abortifacients is a question of fact that can, and should, be answered by science alone. 
208 Brief of Physicians For Reproductive Health, supra note 108. 
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campaign in 2012, just as the Hobby Lobby cases were making their way through the 
lower courts.  Perhaps, in an effort to woo independent voters, his administration chose to 
quietly argue Hobby Lobby on less controversial grounds rather than aggressively attack 
the plaintiffs’ professed religious beliefs as junk science.  
If this theory is correct, however, it shows compellingly why trial judges must act 
on their responsibility to be the gatekeepers.  If the adversaries themselves refuse to 
challenge the junk science—because of a lack of financial resources, or a lack of political 
will—the trial judge must be able to separate fiction from reality, upholding the integrity 
of the judiciary even when the parties do not.  In short, it is the trial judge who can, and 
must, stop alchemy and astrology from running rampant and roughshod over the integrity 
of the courtroom.  
 
 
